Four-Expert Collaborative Piece: "Redefining Terrorism? Organised Crime in Today's Latin America"
Poster design courtesy of Maximilian Frederik van Oordt for KCL Latin American Society and Res Publica Politics.
Between the 24th of June and the 8th of July, El Cortao’ and Res Publica Politics drew up a series of questions on organised crime in Latin America and posed them to four different experts on the region. The questions targeted selected facets of Latin America’s grave security issues, allowing each expert to provide their tailored and divergent evaluations of the subject in brief, yet thorough, article contributions.
This piece is part of a collaboration between the King’s College Latin American Society’s El Cortao’ and the independent Res Publica Politics platform. Our 2021 collaborative panel event titled “Redefining Terrorism? Organised Crime in Today’s Latin America” took place on Monday the 19th of July.
We wish to thank each of our four expert panellists for their extraordinary contributions to this article. Additionally, El Cortao’ wishes to extend its thanks to those who brought this written project to life, including Res Publica Politics’ Nadia Golotchoglou and Tabitha Isabella Boyton, as well as our very own Editor-in-Chief, Maximilian Frederik van Oordt.
How deep does organised crime penetrate the Brazilian state and its institutions? How far has this maimed state efforts to fight organised criminality?
“One of the paradoxes of organised crime is that it is not a parallel institution to the state – it is more like a parasite. It needs structured and functioning institutions to adhere to so it may grow in power and influence. Organised crime penetrates the state and its institutions globally, although this is more evident in some countries than in others. In the case of Brazil, organised crime has certainly penetrated the state and its institutions, but this does not make Brazil a ‘maimed’ state. Brazil has a well-structured and solid judiciary system and a professional and disciplined Federal Police. The country has a strong record of tackling organised crime at the national level and enjoys strong international cooperation on this issue.
Nevertheless, some states in the Brazilian federation, along with many of the country’s major cities, are more vulnerable to the influence of organised crime – especially in relation to arms and drugs trafficking. Here we see a more challenging picture, because in this case we are dealing with an organised criminality that is more diluted and – despite being considerably more noticeable – is also more flexible, thereby making it more difficult to combat. It is the organised crime of retail, not wholesale.
Some of the organised criminal groups operating in Brazil – or originating from Brazil – have grown in their capabilities and networks, expanding internationally to other Latin American countries and even to African ones. In both regions, these groups remain capable of penetrating the host states and institutions. Fundamentally, these organised criminal groups have developed structures to operate like any other company and are often more than willing to bribe corrupt government agents and politicians to increase their profits.”
Dr Vinicius Mariano de Carvalho is Director of the King’s Brazil Institute and Senior Lecturer at the King’s College London Department of War Studies. Dr Carvalho previously served as Director of the Latin American Centre at Denmark's Aarhus University, and is an Associate Researcher at the Centre for Strategic Studies of the Brazilian Navy. He has founded and edited "Brasiliana - Journal for Brazilian Studies" and has edited the "Anthem Brazilian Studies" series.
Looking at current trends in Chile, is the simple drafting of anti-corruption policy sufficient when seeking to protect political institutions from the infiltration of organised crime?
“In Chile, discussions on the crisis of political legitimacy have grown exponentially in the last decade as a result of major corruption cases such as Penta and SQM, among others. Thus, the crisis of legitimacy, understood as the systematic loss of credibility and trust in institutions by broad sectors of the population, has strengthened the arguments in favour of the need to "clean up" politics and institutions in Chile.
Furthermore, cases linking officers of the Carabineros de Chile – the country’s national police – to drug trafficking and violent crime between 2014 and 2016, combined with cases linking the municipality of San Ramón to drug trafficking, have sharpened criticism of political legitimacy in Chile and of the nature of this legitimacy. The visibility of the power network associated with the re-elected mayor of San Ramón, Miguel Ángel Aguilera, a former member of the Socialist Party (PS), has redirected discussions on corruption in Chile towards the permeation of drug trafficking in the political and institutional system, pointing to the Municipality of San Ramón as the first narco-municipality in Chile. Aguilera's re-election as head of the municipality, despite charges of alleged illicit enrichment, bribery, money laundering, and despite being investigated for his links to drug trafficking, should set off alarm bells about the possible new dynamics of power and governance that may be developing in Chile.
This is not only serious because of the social implications of having drug trafficking permeate a country's political and institutional system, but also because it poses a serious threat to democracy. Indeed, the conspicuousness of these cases damages political legitimacy, thereby raising the risks of institutional breakdown and, consequently, reducing stability in a country’s democratic dynamics. In this sense, solid public institutions – led by non-corrupt officials – are key to combating drug trafficking and its permeation of the institutional framework. Nevertheless, scenes such as Aguilera's re-election indicate another reality; they show that the institutional framework has indeed been penetrated to a certain extent and that, in this instance, organised crime has used the municipality of San Ramón as a platform to ensure the fulfilment of its own interests, thereby jeopardising the legitimacy of the municipality and, consequently, that of the entire political system.
Considering the above, establishing measures such as anti-corruption policies is not enough. If drug trafficking has managed to permeate Chilean politics and institutions, then institutional measures such as public policymaking will be neither efficient nor effective in the fight against organised crime. Given this context, the arguments in favour of re-establishing political institutions as a prerequisite to the definition of anti-corruption policies are increasingly crucial. It is not enough to toughen sanctions against drug trafficking and corruption in public institutions; it is also necessary to re-establish political institutions by making changes that range from elements related to hierarchies, powers, and attributions of the different public sector bodies and actors, to ideological elements such as the sense of institutional organisation and the governance model.”
Marieta Constanza Valdivia Lefort holds a Master's Degree in Public Policy from University College London (UCL) and a Bachelor's Degree in Education from Chile's Universidad Diego Portales (UDP). She is currently undertaking a PhD at UCL's Institute of the Americas and is Assistant Lecturer at UDP.
How, where, and for what ends have certain states employed criminal violence as political paramilitary auxiliaries and/or replacements for standard policing and security forces/roles?
“Latin American states have long tolerated, and often encouraged, the use of extralegal force to counter crime and reduce violence in the region. Indigenous groups in Peru have provided security in rural settings since the nineteenth century and, in the last few decades, Latin American governments have colluded with urban criminal groups to maintain social order in many of the region's rapidly growing cities. The mobilisation of criminal groups to fill security gaps across Latin America has occurred despite the emergence of stable democratic regimes, and it indicates that the collaboration between official forces and illegal organisations is likely to continue.
Brazil provides a telling example. As Graham Denyer Willis expertly describes in his The Killing Consensus (2015), the São Paulo state police have partially delegated to the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), a drug-trafficking group, the authority to administer justice in several of the state's violent neighbourhoods. Similarly, Enrique Desmond Arias and Nicholas Barnes (2016) argue that police commanders in Rio de Janeiro have large discretion in dealing with criminal organisations, and some of them directly cooperate with drug gangs to regulate violence in the city's favelas.
Paramilitary groups have also operated under the protection of state forces in other countries in the region. In Venezuela, Presidents Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro have strengthened urban colectivos, extralegal organisations in charge of suppressing opposition members and allegedly coordinating criminal activities. The same is true in Guatemala and Honduras, where police forces have been accused of colluding with powerful street gangs to carry out extrajudicial killings (Cruz, 2016).
What drives these shadowy ties between state officials and criminal groups? One explanation is the rising popular concern with security across Latin America, which has put pressure on politicians to adopt unorthodox approaches to curb crime and thereby make electoral gains. Paradoxically, this has sometimes involved partnering with powerful local gangs and eliminating rival groups in order to achieve social stability. Another related reason is that democratisation has effectively limited the use of force by Latin American states, which have adapted by turning to criminal gangs to silence opposition members and other threats to government power. Lastly, it is important to mention that poor salaries, difficult working conditions, and institutional corruption have created incentives for members of state security organisations to join criminal networks. The financial benefits from drug trafficking are immense, and state officials often want a share of them, too.
In this regard, Latin American states still struggle to meet the Weberian definition of monopoly on force. While they have made progress in terms of human rights protections, excessive use of force and fragmented sovereignty over the territory remain pervasive in the region. Police reform and increased accountability of state institutions are certainly required to improve the rule of law in Latin America. Nevertheless, extralegal groups will continue to play a significant role in maintaining order and providing public services in the region – at least in the short term.”
Dr Danilo Freire is Senior Lecturer at the School of Social and Political Sciences of the University of Lincoln. He holds a PhD in Political Economy from King's College London University, a Master's Degree in International Relations from the Graduate Institute of Geneva, and is a former research associate at The Political Theory Project of Brown University.
How has democratisation affected Mexico’s security woes?
Democracy is a competitive struggle for the people’s vote (to paraphrase Schumpeter) that minimizes violence by establishing clear rules and procedures. The losers of elections normally accept this arrangement because, all things being equal, today’s losers may be tomorrow’s winners. Therefore, a reduction in violence (particularly political violence) is often seen as one of the positive consequences of democracy and democratisation. Yet, Mexico seems to have experienced the complete opposite. Since the transition to democracy in 2000 violence has been steadily increasing in the country. Each year seems to be more violent than the last, with 2019 being the most violent year in the country’s history with over 35,000 homicides. Despite the pandemic, 2020 saw nearly as many homicides as 2019 and May 2021 was one of the most violent months ever with nearly 3,000 homicides.
Why, then, has a political arrangement that is meant to minimise violence lead to such an increase in it? There are no easy answers, but a lot of it has to do with the faulty democratisation process itself; particularly the hurried and uneven process of decentralisation that took place withing the context of democratisation. In a nutshell, if authoritarianism is understood as a centralisation of power, then democratisation must be understood as decentralisation of power. Following this crude principle, political elites in Mexico saw decentralisation as a necessity for democratisation; the democratic opposition focused their efforts on local and regional elections as a way to challenge the regime at the federal level. This was indeed a successful strategy in some states but led to an uneven democratisation process. As some states and regions saw relatively peaceful and successful handovers of power, other parts of the country saw far less significant democratic advancements and the creation of power vacuums. It was these power vacuums that were eagerly and easily filled by organised criminal organisations and other less-than-democratic forces.
A second aspect related to the democratisation process that has contributed to the security crisis in Mexico is linked to the afore mentioned power vacuums. Moving away from authoritarianism is not only about decentralising power but also about deconcentrating it. In Mexico this process meant taking power away from a regime that had ruled for over 70 years. Weakening the regime without weakening the actual state was impossible. A such, the transition to democracy led to an overall weakening of the state, the collapse of previous arrangements that limited the power of organised crime and hindered the overall capacity of the state to fight drug cartels. The weakening of the Mexican state coincided with the emergence of new profitable drug markets in the USA and beyond (opioids and synthetic drugs) that strengthen the position of drug cartels in Mexico. A toxic combination that explains much of the increase in violence in Mexico.
Dr Pablo Calderón-Martínez is Assistant Professor at the New College of the Humanities and a former Teaching Fellow at King’s College London University (KCL). He holds a PhD in Spanish and Latin American Politics/Democracy and Democratisation from KCL, an MSc in European Identities from the London School of Economics, and a BA in International Relations from Mexico's ITESO University. Additionally, he is a fellow of the Higher Education Academy and a member of the Mexican National System of Researchers.
